The shadow of the caliphate: Daesh and Syria’s unfinished battle

Since the collapse of the Assad regime and the subsequent rise of Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) and its allies, who assumed control and began constructing a new political order, Daesh has maintained a persistent and vitriolic rhetorical campaign against Ahmad Al Sharaa, the current Syrian president and former HTS leader. The group accuses Al Sharaa of being a Western agent, part of the "awakening" trend, and of having abandoned Islamic principles to curry favour with the Americans and Europeans, and their allies, has called upon HTS fighters and other Islamist factions to revolt against Al Sharaa and recommit to the ideological doctrine of extremist Islamism in Syria, namely the re-establishment of an "Islamic State" akin to the one previously created and lost by Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

Despite the dramatic decline of its territorial presence and the assassination of most of its senior leaders, including four successive self-styled caliphs following the death of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi in a U. raid in 2019, Daesh has not been eliminated. Instead, it has adapted to the shifting security and political landscapes, preserving a clandestine force of thousands of fighters trained in guerrilla warfare, desert insurgency, and urban concealment. The group’s recruitment networks and ideological propaganda remain disturbingly effective.

Recent reports by UN counter-terrorism agencies warn that Daesh’s operational threat has intensified—not only in Syria and Iraq but also in Afghanistan, where its Khorasan branch is engaged in violent conflict with the Taliban regime. Moreover, Daesh’s growing presence in Africa, where it exploits ungoverned spaces, internal conflicts, and state fragility, has transformed the continent into the group’s most active theatre.

The central question is: how real and how imminent is the threat of Daesh’s resurgence in Syria? The answer depends heavily on the evolving political and security context, both domestically and regionally. The most decisive factor in constraining the group’s influence will be the new Syrian government’s ability to consolidate security, extend inclusive governance, rebuild state institutions, and restore basic services. Reviving the economy, addressing public grievances, and fostering national unity are essential to undercutting Daesh’s appeal.

Yet these goals cannot be achieved in isolation from regional and international dynamics. Syria remains crippled by suffocating sanctions that have devastated its economy. Moreover, conflicting agenda among regional powers, some of which actively seek to exacerbate internal divisions—pose significant barriers to stability. Of particular concern is the aggressive Israeli posture under prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose government has reportedly sought to prolong fragmentation in Syria and prevent the reemergence of a unified state.

Should efforts to build state institutions falter, and if the provision of essential services remains weak or absent, especially under the strain of ongoing sanctions and continued sectarian and ethnic polarization, such a vacuum would offer Daesh fertile ground to regroup. In this scenario, the organisation could regain traction among disenfranchised populations, foreign fighters still in hiding, and even segments of Islamist-leaning armed factions. This could manifest in high-impact operations designed to provoke internal conflict, such as the bombing near the Sayyida Zaynab shrine or flare-ups on the Syrian coast, events that have historically proven pivotal in inflaming sectarian tensions.

A highly valuable report by Syrian journalist and researcher Mohammad Hassan, titled “ISIS in the New Syria: The Battle Is Not Over” (published in Al Furats magazine), offers an in-depth analysis of the group’s residual influence. Drawing on fieldwork in former ISIS (English acronym for Daesh) strongholds across the Syrian desert and rural areas in the north, east, and south—as well as interviews with ex- and current members of the group, Hassan concludes that ISIS remains active, though in waiting, poised to exploit any strategic rupture.

Equally alarming is the continued detention of tens of thousands of Daesh-affiliated individuals in prisons controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). One facility alone houses an estimated 8,000 Daesh fighters. The group has made repeated attempts to liberate these detainees, who represent a significant and growing security risk. Any breakdown in order—whether due to conflict, sabotage, or neglect, could trigger a mass breakout with profound consequences for Syria and the region at large.

Recent diplomatic meetings, such as the one between President Al Sharaa and the Iraqi prime minister, as well as the increased political engagement by Jordan and Saudi Arabia in supporting the new Syrian government, offer hope for a constructive regional framework. But for these efforts to succeed, they must evolve into a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for rebuilding Syria and confronting destabilizing regional agendas. Anything less risks leaving the door open for Daesh to reclaim the narrative of resistance and reassert itself violently into the Syrian equation